If there is one battle that can truly be called a turning point in the overall context of a war, the vote should go to the capture of the Haji Pir bulge under Operation Bakshi in August 1965, an important area for infiltration into the Kashmir Valley and the Rajouri-Poonch areas, writes Maj Gen. RPS Bhadauria (Retd)
India has fought four major wars and a conflict since its independence. Many heroic acts and decisive moments in the history of valour, sacrifice and team spirit displayed by Indian soldiers come to mind, but if there is one battle that can truly be called a turning point in the overall context of a war, the vote should go to the capture of the Haji Pir bulge under Operation Bakshi in August 1965. An important area for infiltration into the Kashmir Valley and the Rajouri-Poonch areas.
During the Indo-Pakistani War of 1965, the Pakistan Army was involved in several military operations in the Kashmir region. The war began on April 1, 1965 and lasted until September 23, 1965. The conflict primarily centred around the disputed region of Kashmir and its surrounding areas. I will mention a few examples of valour in the Kashmir Sector.
Operation Gibraltar: Miscalculation in the Valley
Operation Gibraltar was a military manoeuvre conceived and executed by the Pakistan Army during August 1965 in the contested expanse of Jammu and Kashmir. This covert operation was formulated with the intent of clandestinely breaching the Line of Control (LoC) and provoking an insurrection within the predominantly Muslim populace of Kashmir against the Indian governmental authority. Pakistani military strategists believed that such a local uprising, triggered by Operation Gibraltar, would substantiate Pakistan’s justifications against India on the global platform.
The Capture of Haji Pir Pass
The Haji Pir Pass, located at 2,637 metres in the Pir Panjal range, has been a key land route and was a major infiltration route even during the 1947 mujahideen incursion. Pakistan, under its Operation Gibraltar, aimed at inciting rebellion in Kashmir and pushed infiltrators into the Valley. On 15 Aug 1965, Indian forces crossed the Ceasefire Line to counter Pakistani shelling and infiltration.
The operation, codenamed Bakshi, involved a pincer movement by the 19th Infantry Division, with 1 PARA, led by Major Ranjit Singh Dayal. The Indian Army captured Sank by 27 Aug after a night-long trek by soldiers in heavy rain. By 10.30 AM on 28 Aug, Dayal’s team outflanked the Pakistani defenders and secured the Haji Pir pass. The victory shortened the Poonch-Uri route from 282 km to 56 km and enhanced India’s logistical control.
Haji Pir Pass divides the Srinagar valley from the Jammu region. A wide, metal highway connected Srinagar to Jammu via Uri-Poonch–Rajouri through this Pass, over which the bulk of passenger and trade traffic used to ply to and fro prior to Partition. The road is of strategic importance as it connects Uri with Poonch, but it became unusable when a major portion of the road went to Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (POK). Trained Pakistani terrorists keep sneaking into the Kashmir Valley, Poonch and Rajouri districts. The entire area of the strategic Pass occupied by Pakistan is known as the Hajipir Bulge.
Ayub Khan had this utopian dream to grab the Kashmir Valley through massive multiple infiltrations (Gibraltar Force) and simultaneously capture the single bridge on the Chenab River at Akhnoor, which was the key to Indian communications from Jammu and a group of valleys lying south of the Pir Panjal Range and west of the Chenab River, most prominent being the Poonch Valley. Simultaneously, Pakistan resorted to heavy artillery shelling on Indian positions near Tithwal, Uri and Poonch.
The Indian reaction was swift, advancing up to the Kishenganga River in the Tithwal Sector, capturing Point 13620 in the Kargil Sector, and securing Rishmar Ridge and Pir Sahiba in the Tithwal Sector. Additionally, they captured the Sunjoi feature on the outskirts of Mirpur and the Ring Contour overlooking the Mirpur Bridge. Next was the capture of Hajipir Pass and then Point 9013 in the Tithwal Sector, giving our troops complete domination of the Mirpur area right up to the bridge at Jura on the Kishenganga River.
The attacks were launched during the night of 25-26 Aug, but in spite of the determined attack, 1 PARA fell back, and 19 Punjab could not proceed beyond the Bedori base. The first light of 26 Aug was the defining moment for the commander of 68 Infantry Brigade as both thrust lines got stalled. In the afternoon of 26 August, the commander was informed that Bedori had been captured by a flanking formation, and the news was broadcast to the nation on All India Radio. Brigadier Bakshi reluctantly believed the news about the capture of Bedori and tasked 4 RAJPUT to skirt around it. While bypassing Bedori, 4 RAJPUT came under heavy fire from Bedori. It was realised the next day that the information was wrong and that Bedori was still with the enemy.
On the night of August 26-27, 1 PARA attacked again and captured Lediwali Gali by midday on August 27. With Bedori, a formidable feature, still with the enemy, the commander of 68 Infantry Brigade planned to contain it through 4 RAJPUT and pull out 19 PUNJAB to task it to capture the Hajipir Pass by moving through 1 PARA on the Lediwali axis. It was turned down by the ‘powers that be,’ and instead, the commander was directed to capture Bedori on a priority basis and Hajipir subsequently, since Bedori had been announced as having been captured. However, the commander remained committed to capturing Hajipir without loss of time. Speed was the most essential factor for capturing Hajipir since any delay would give time to the enemy to reinforce defences.
Brigadier Bakshi decided upon an unorthodox plan: to send a self-contained company plus a column from 1 PARA under Maj Ranjit Singh Dayal from Lediwali Gali during the night of 27-28 Aug from Lediwali Gali height of 3,140 metres, descend to Hyderabad Nullah below, cross it and then ascend to Hajipir Pass at 2,637 metres — all in one night. The weather was at its worst, with rain and slush coming down the craggy slopes. Brigadier Bakshi spoke to Major Dayal in chaste Punjabi: “Agar te jit leya Hajipir te tu hero ban jayenga, nahi te mainu command ton remove kar den ge” (If you capture Hajipir, you shall be a hero, and if you don’t, I’ll be sacked) or words to that effect.
Major Dayal carried out the arduous mission in the treacherous terrain and weather prevailing that night. He appeared at the Pass by the first light of 28 Aug. Pakistan had moved a company of 20 PUNJAB during the night to reinforce defences at Hajipir. Pakistan troops were so surprised that they retreated from the shoulders of the Pass with little fight, leaving behind weapons, radio sets, charging engines, meter maps and desi ghee! The capture of the Pass validated the importance of the element of surprise by taking calculated risks and making bold manoeuvres.
Meanwhile, 19 PUNJAB remained held up near the Bedori base because the ridge was narrow, and it was not feasible to capture Pt 12330 (Bedori) from the north-west. Brigadier Bakshi now decided to launch 19 PUNJAB from a completely different direction. The 3.7-inch Howitzer artillery gun was used to decimate the bunkers, and Pt 12330 was captured on 29 Aug. However, a complex of high mountain features, Gitian and Pt 8777, dominated the road from Hajipir to Poonch. 6 DOGRA, with an additional company from 19 PUNJAB, was tasked to capture the Gitian complex.
It was probably the toughest battle in the entire Hajipir operations, where Pakistanis resorted to repeated counter-attacks, both during the night and day. Our three Officers, one Junior Commissioned Officer (JCO) and 32 Jawans sacrificed their lives for the nation, and five officers, three JCOs and 80 jawans were wounded. The enemy had 90 dead, while an estimated 200 were wounded. For this valiant effort, 6 DOGRA was bestowed with the battle honour ‘Hajipir’.
Hours prior to this battle, the vital communication line between the tactical headquarters at Hajipir and 6 DOGRA broke down due to heavy shelling, leading to a precarious communication gap which was vital at this critical juncture. Subedar Jai Singh of 6 DOGRA remains a celebrated war hero, known for his extraordinary bravery during the fierce fighting near Haji Pir Pass. In the Battle of Gitian, Jai Singh’s platoon bore the brunt of intense combat, losing 24 soldiers, including two officers, in a single night. Despite being the lone survivor of this harrowing encounter, Subedar Jai Singh’s spirit remained unbroken. Leading the bloodied unit that was battered but unbowed, he inspired his men to press forward relentlessly. Their fierce determination and sacrifice were pivotal in capturing the objective, fulfilling their promise to fight on regardless of the cost. Jai Singh’s courage and resilience epitomise the indomitable spirit of the Indian soldier, whose valour and commitment to duty continue to inspire generations.
If India were to enter into a conventional battle with Pakistan, Haji Pir Pass would be an important strategic objective since it cuts into J&K by severing the Poonch-Uri route and can provide access to much of POK. That is the opportunity Ayub provided in 1965. Haji Pir Pass was dominated by hill features, Bedori (3760m) on the east, Sank (2895m) on the west and Ledwali Gali (3140m) to the South-West, all of which required capture before tackling Haji Pir Pass, Bedori being 14 kms southeast of the CFL and Haji Pir Pass 10 kms southwest of Bedori.
The daring capture of the Haji Pir Pass by Major (later Lieutenant General) Ranjit Singh Dyal, involving a climb of over 1,220 m in hours of darkness and heavy rain, made international news and proved a major setback to Pakistani morale. Its fall completed the link-up of Uri with Poonch. The Uri-Poonch Road link was restored, and the strategic Jammu–Rajouri–Srinagar Road, which had been out of use since 1947, became functional again. Later, many enemy posts continued to be captured right up to Kahuta, which was also captured subsequently.
“With a crisp salute and ramrod straight bearing, Haji Pir War Hero Sub Jai Singh of 6 DOGRA stands, jaw clenched and eyes telling stories of battle, his unseen heart swelling with pride.” It is the story of War Hero Hari Pir Sub Jai Singh of 6 DOGRA,” he is saluting his comrades who laid down their lives while climbing along with him on the treacherous slopes of Haji Pir, 60 years ago. He lost his entire platoon that day, the lone survivor of a night when 24 brothers, including two officers, fell. The unit, bloodied but unbowed, captured the objective in the Battle of GITIAN, honouring the promise to fight on, whatever the cost. Sixty years since the Hajipir victory, this salute at the Diamond Jubilee Memorial in Boniyar is a living emblem of the camaraderie, courage, and sacrifice that define our army. This is our army where brotherhood endures, memories are honoured, and valour never fades.
The capture of the Haji Pir Pass restored the Uri-Ponch Road link, and the strategic Jammu-Rajouri-Srinagar Road, which had been out of use since 1947, became functional again. Unfortunately, under the Russian brokered Tashkent Accord signed on 16 Jan 1966, Indian and Pakistani forces withdrew to their respective positions as prior to 5 Aug 1965, and the Haji Pir Pass was returned to Pakistan. Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri signed the accord in good faith. The hero of the capture of Haji Pir, Lt General Ranjit Singh Dya,l awarded Maha Vir Chakra in 1965, said in an interview in 2002, “The Pass would have given India a definite strategic advantage….It was a mistake to hand it back….our people don’t read maps.”
(Maj Gen. RPS Bhadauria (Retd) is the Additional Director General of the Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS), New Delhi, and was formerly the Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies & Simulation (CS3) at USI of India, having served in the Indian Army for 36 years.)
