When the West was watching a possible Russia-India-China (RIC) axis take form in Tianjin, there were some murmurs that Japan — not part of SCO — could be the fourth corner of a new Quad….reports Asian Lite News
En route to the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit in Tianjin, China, Prime Minister Narendra Modi paid a two-day official visit to Japan in late August.
In deliberations with the then Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba of Japan, the two premiers appreciated the partnership over the last decade and held discussions on ways to strengthen it.
The two countries adopted a 10-year roadmap to deepen the India-Japan Special Strategic and Global Partnership. This included Japan committing to double its investment in India to JPY 10 trillion (roughly USD 67 billion).
India and Japan also pledged to work jointly in other areas, including high-speed rail, metro systems, enhancing financial, SME, agri-business, and ICT collaboration etc.
Around the same time, Japan’s top trade negotiator Ryosei Akazawa called off his US visit at the last minute. The sudden decision was linked to bilateral issues that still needed to be debated at the administrative level.
Dispute continued over Washington saying that President Donald Trump will have “complete discretion” over how Japan’s USD 550 billion in investments and loans are allocated to the US under the two countries’ tariff deal.
However, on September 4, US President Donald Trump signed an executive, applying a baseline 15 per cent tariff on nearly all Japanese imports.
The agreement, said White House, lowered tariffs on Japanese automobiles from 25 to 15 per cent and included Tokyo’s investment commitment.
Incidentally, the India-Japan deal and the reduction of US tariffs were among the key wins for Ishiba.
On Sunday, he said that the decision to step down came when Japan’s negotiations with the US had reached a conclusion.
When the West was watching a possible Russia-India-China (RIC) axis take form in Tianjin, there were some murmurs that Japan — not part of SCO — could be the fourth corner of a new Quad.
There was a thought that RIC could get Japan’s support in its defence against the US tariffs. Now, Ishiba’s abrupt departure from Japan’s premiership has injected fresh uncertainty into Tokyo’s strategic pivot.
A cohesive grouping of China, Russia, India, and Japan could likely encompass roughly one-third of global GDP and nearly 40 per cent of the world’s population, giving it an unprecedented scale.
China and Japan alone account for over half of that bloc’s total output, while India’s rapid growth and Russia’s energy exports bolster collective resources. Economically, such a coalition could reshape trade routes, investment patterns, and technology standards across Eurasia.
Now, across East and Southeast Asia, governments need to recalibrate trade and investment priorities in light of Japan’s internal transition and US protectionism.
China, ever-adept at filling vacuums, is likely to intensify its overtures via the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). South Korea and ASEAN economies, facing competitive pressures, may accelerate efforts to establish alternative free-trade architectures independent of US tariffs.
Over time, the speculations over a possible RICJ-led defence against trade tariffs will be answered with a new Prime Minister of Japan assuming office.
